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THE DOMINANT OIL AND GAS ESTATEMASTER OR SERVANT -OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE
William B. Browder*

T

HE grant of an oil and gas lease carries with it the right to use so
much of the leased premises in a manner reasonably necessary to
comply with the terms of the lease and effectuate its purposes. The
lessee is the owner of the dominant estate, the lessor the owner of
the servient estate. As owner of the dominant estate the lessee has
the legal right to use land reasonably necessary in his operations to
the exclusion of the owner of the servient surface estate. He has
the right and privilege to go on the land and do all things necessary
and incidental to the drilling of the wells and to the production of
the oil and gas. The surface owner is entitled to recover damages
from the lessee only for wanton or negligent damage or destruction
or for the use of more land than is reasonably necessary.
These rules governing the relationship between the lessor and the
lessee are simple to state. The scope and limitations as fixed by the
courts of the various states are often more difficult to determine. In
most of the opinions it is broadly declared that a lessee has the right
to go on the land and do all things "necessary or incidental" to his
operations "to the exclusion of the lessor." However, an explanation
usually follows that, even so, the operator must exercise his rights
"with due regard to the rights of the owners of the surface." The
problems confronting the attorney who must be prepared to reconcile these issues in his presentation to a trial court are illustrated in
the language of several recent decisions of the Texas Supreme Court.
For example, in Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin' the court said:
The petitioner [lessee] was lawfully in possession of the premises
and being the owner of the dominant estate had the legal right to use
so much of the leased premises as were reasonably necessary in its
operation to the exclusion of respondent [lessor], the owner of the
servient estate....
There is no evidence that petitioner intentionally permitted the oil
to escape from the pump. The only duty owed the respondent was not

to intentionally, wilfully or wantonly injure his [lessor's] cattle. The
jury has found that petitioner did not intentionally injure the cattle.
* Attorney at Law, Midland, Texas. LL.B., Southern Methodist University.
is an adaptation of an address delivered at the general session of the Section of
Natural Resources Law at the 1962 Annual Convention of the American Bar
Reprinted with special permission from the 1962 Proceedings of the Section of
Natural Resources Law of the American Bar Association.
' 153 Tex. 465, 469, 271 S.W.2d 410, 412-13 (1954).
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It was necessary for respondent to plead and prove that petitioner
used more land than was necessary.
Compared to this is the more recent statement of the court in Brown

v. Lundell:'
The right of the lessee in exploring for and producing oil and gas
embraces only the doing of those things expressly granted or necessarily
implied in the lease as necessarily incidental thereto. All property rights
not granted are reserved in the lessor. The rights of the lessor and
lessee are reciprocal and distinct. If either party exceeds those rights he
becomes a trespasser. . . . Thus, if the lessee negligently and unnecessarily damages the lessor's land, either surface or subsurface, his liability to the lessor is no different from what it would be under the
same circumstances to an adjoining landowner. . . . The use of the
lessor's land is limited. In other words the lessor has granted and
leased to the lessee only so much of his land as will be reasonably
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the lease, and to be used in a
non-negligent manner.

In his dissenting opinion in Brown v. Lundell, Justice Smith pointed out to the majority:
Under the authorities, as I interpret them, the oil and gas lessee has
the right to take without paying damages a part of the surface of the
land for drilling operations, and the lessee is not liable to the lessor
or his tenant for a negligent use of that land so long as he takes no
more than is reasonably necessary. The lessee's only liability, admitting

that the part of the premises taken is reasonably necessary, is for wilful,
intentional or wanton destruction of the lessor's property ...
The cases recognize the right of the lessee to exclusive possession of
so much of the land as is reasonably necessary for his operations ...
Since there is no evidence showing the boundaries of the area, either
on, above, or below the surface which the lessee is entitled to use to
the exclusion of the lessor, how can it be said with any degree of
certainty that the salt water has escaped beyond the area which the
lessee had the right to use? The rules of common law negligence cannot be applied until this controlling issue has been determined ...
This court refers to the case of Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 304 S.W.2d 362, 65 A.L.R.2d 1352 (1957). ...
The court here admits that this case correctly states the law, yet the
majority here is willing to assess damages against petitioner without
requiring a finding that more land was used than was reasonably necessary. The court has by implication held that the jury findings of
negligence are the equivalent of findings that the petitioners used more
land than was reasonably necessary. ... '
2162 Tex. 85,

87, 344 S.W.2d 863, 866 (1961).

Id. at 97-99, 344 S.W.2d at 872-73.
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As an example of the problem to be solved by an attorney seeking
to advise an oil company client concerning proposed recovery opera-

tions, consider the holding of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in Armstrong v. Skelly Oil Co." In that case the
court held that the lessee could use all of the gas produced in order
to stimulate production of oil, if reasonably necessary, and said:
Based on the clauses above quoted, we think it is a fair and reasonable
construction of the lease that the lessee had the right to use all of the
gas produced, whether from oil wells or gas wells only, to stimulate
the production of oil, if in the exercise of good judgment it was reasonably necessary ...
There is no doubt that appellees had the right to use all the gas
produced on the land without cost, as it was reasonably necessary to
properly work the property and to recover the oil produced in the
most economical manner. . . .. (Emphasis added.)
In contrast, there is the opinion of the same court in Dunn v.
Republic Natural Gas Co.,' in which the court denied the lessee the
right to use gas free of cost for jetting and repressuring, and said:
We agree with appellants and not with the District Judge though, that
they [the lessors] are entitled to a recovery for all of the gas used for
"jetting", as well as that used on their leases as that used on the leases
of others. 7 (Emphasis added.)
How can such language and holdings be reconciled? How can a

practicing lawyer give advice to his clients on the probable legal
effects of their activities? An analytical approach to problems such

as these-and there are many more than the two just posed-requires
an examination of the lessor-lessee relationship as it has evolved
through the courts over the years.
I. USE OF THE SURFACE

A. General Principles
It is fundamental, of course, that certain surface uses by the
lessee are consistently recognized within clearly defined limits. The
typical oil and gas lease contains express provisions for the use of
the surface. Most of the modern lease forms provide that the lessor
"has granted, demised, leased and let and by these presents does
grant, demise, lease and let unto said lessee, with the exclusive right
to prospect, explore, by use of core drills or otherwise ...
" Other
455 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1932).
5 Id. at 1068.
6 124 F.2d 128 (sth Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 821
7Id.

at 130.

(1942).
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forms state that the lessor "grants, leases and lets to the lessee the
following described property for the purposes of investigating, exploring, prospecting, drilling and mining for and producing oil, gas
and all other minerals. . . ." Some provide only that the property
is leased "for the sole and only purpose of mining and operating for
oil, gas, potash, or any other minerals, and of laying of pipelines and
of building of tanks, power stations and structures thereon, to produce, save and take care of said products."
The courts and the text and article writers have consistently
recognized that, whether expressed or not, the lease carries with it
a right to possession and use of the surface. The basis for this view
is the fundamental and often stated precept that the "rule is based
upon the principle that, when a thing is granted, all the means to
obtain it and all the fruits and effects of it are also granted."'
The Texas courts have explained that the grant or reservation of
minerals carries with it, as a necessary appurtenance, the right to
use so much of the surface as may be necessary to enforce and enjoy
the mineral estate conveyed or reserved.! They have said that the
lessee owns the dominant estate in the land for the purposes of
drilling for, producing, storing, and marketing oil."' In Guffey v.
Stroud,5 the commission of appeals made the grant plain, declaring
that the grant of the oil also carried with it a grant of the right-ofway, surface, soil, water, gas, and the like essential to enjoyment of
the actual grant of the oil. The Texas courts have gone even further
by stating that the mineral lessee possesses the "exclusive right" to
' Squires v. Lafferty, 95 W. Va. 307, 309, 121 S.E. 90, 91 (1924); see 4 Summers, Oil
and Gas § 652, at 4 (1962).
'See Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 85, 344 S.W.2d 863 (1961); Warren Petroleum Corp.
v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 304 S.W.2d 362 (1957); Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 176
S.W.2d 302 (1943); Eternal Cemetery Corp. v. Tammen, 324 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959) error ref. n.r.e.; Arnold H. Bruner & Co. v. McCauley, 319 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958); Robinson Drilling Co. v. Moses, 256 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953);
Meyer v. Cox, 252 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref.; Placid Oil Co. v. Lee,
243 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Wimberley, 181
S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Stradley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 155 S.W.2d 649
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref.; Joyner v. R. H. Dearing & Sons, 134 S.W.2d 757 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939) error dism., judgm. cor.; Campbell v. Schrock, 10 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928); Cozart v. Crenshaw, 299 S.W. 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Mid-Texas Petroleum Co. v. Colcord, 235 S.W. 710 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); 31-A Tex. Jur. Oil & Gas
§ 52 (1947).
"Parker v. Texas Co., 326 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.; Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Walton, 317 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Miller v. Crown Cent.
Petroleum Corp., 309 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Placid Oil Co. v. Lee, 243
S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); West Cent. Drilling Co. v. Malone, 219 S.W.2d 601
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Perry, 191 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App.
1945); Carter v. Simmons, 178 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Pitzer & West v.
Williamson, 159 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error dism.; Shell Petroleum Corp. v.
Liberty Gravel & Sand Co., 128 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
"116 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
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use so much of the leased premises as is reasonably -necessary in the
operations in drilling for and in producing oil and gas."2
The courts of California and other states have, on the other hand,
generally stated that the lessee merely takes the right to such part
of the surface as is reasonably necessary to secure, develop, and care
for the oil and gas produced. This is so even where the lease is silent
as to the uses of the surface conveyed. 3 An Arkansas court, however,
has apparently announced the same rule as the Texas courts, that is,
that the lessee's rights are exclusive for the term of the lease.14
The Illinois courts have held that the law implies a grant of the
right to use all of the premises which is essential to the enjoyment of
the property granted." An illustration of this doctrine is Phoenix v.
6
Graham,"
where an Illinois court stated with respect to the disposal
of salt water:
The proprietor of oil land free from salt water has a natural advantage,
and owns a better property than one whose land is subject to the evil.
The latter has a burden attached to his ownership, and no logical reason
can be given for the law to remove that burden, and give him a better
property than he owns, by casting the entire burden on the operator
to dispose of the salt at his peril. The burden on the operator is sufficient if he is required to use the reasonable care of the ordinary prudent operator.
Oklahoma courts have expressed the thought that the holder of
a valid oil and gas lease has the right and privilege to go on the land
and do all those things necessary and incidental to the drilling of
wells, including the right to use the surface; the only basis for recovery of damages by the surface owner is by proof of wanton or
negligent destruction, or of damage to a portion of the land not
"2Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 271 S.W.2d 410 (1954); Stephenson v. Glass, 276 S.W. 1110 (Tex. Civ. App.), error ref. n.r.e., 115 Tex. 192, 279 S.W.
260 (1926).
"Wohlford v. American Gas Prod. Co., 218 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1955); Vodopija v.
Gulf Ref. Co., 198 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1952); MacDonnell v. Capital Co., 130 F.2d 311
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 692 (1942); Conway v. Skelly Oil Co., 54 F.2d 11
(10th Cir. 1931); Brookshire Oil Co. v. Casmalia Ranch Oil & Dev. Co., 156 Cal. 211,
103 P. 927 (1909); Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp., 38 Cal. App. 2d 11, 100 P.2d 528
(Dist. Ct. App. 1940), 48 Cal. App. 2d 429, 119 P.2d 973 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941), 63 Cal.
App. 2d 201, 146 P.2d 256 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944); Phoenix v. Graham, 349 Il. App. 326,
110 N.E.2d 669 (1953); Benefiel v. Pure Oil Co., 322 Ill. App. 5, 53 N.E.2d 726 (1944);
Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So. 2d 253 (La. App. 1958); Gulf Ref. Co. v.
Davis, 224 Miss. 464, 80 So. 2d 467 (1955); Bell v. Cardinal Drilling Co., 85 N.W.2d 246
(N.D. 1957); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dacus, 325 P.2d 1035 (Okla. 1958); Powell Briscoe,
Inc. v. Peters, 269 P.2d 787 (Okla. 1954); Pure Oil Co. v. Gear, 183 Okla. 489, 83 P.2d
389 (1938).
'"Henry
v. Gulf Ref. Co., 176 Ark. 133, 2 S.W.2d 687 (1927).
"Jilek v. Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co., 382 Ill. 241, 47 N.E.2d 96 (1943);
Threlkeld v. Inglett, 289 IIl. 90, 124 N.E. 368 (1919).
1349 Il1. App. 326, 110 N.E.2d 669, 672 (1953).
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reasonably necessary for the oil and gas development.17 This is in
line with the decisions of the Texas courts. 8
It is difficult to draw conclusions from these varied holdings. However, certain accepted principles have been espoused:
In the first place, a certain amount of use of and damage to the
leased premises is regarded as being authorized under the express or
implied terms of the lease contract. ....
If it develops that damage was sustained by or upon the leased
premises, the principle employed by the courts as a starting point for
discussion of the problem is that the mineral lease creates and vests
in the lessee the dominant estate in the surface of the land for the
purposes of the lease. As the holder of the dominant estate, the mineral
lessee is permitted to occupy such space and do such damage as is
reasonably necessary to conduct the operations permitted by the lease.
This simply means that the lessor has, through the mineral lease,
authorized by implication such conduct of the lessee, and of course
there can be no recovery by him for damage resulting from authorized
conduct on his property. 9
Although the reason is not always clear, the courts" usually add,
5 "Of
as did the Texas court in Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin,"
course, each must exercise their respective rights with due regard for
the rights of the other." Alternatively, courts quote from the often
cited opinion in Gulf Prod. Co. v. Continental Oil Co.: "Of course,
in a lease of this character the surface estate is servient to the mineral
estate for the purposes of the mineral grant, but even this right is
to be reasonably 22exercised with due regard to the rights of the owner
of the surface.

B. As To Cotenants
With respect to cotenants, the generally prevailing rule is that a
lessee of any one tenant in common has the right to go upon and
"Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 301 P.2d 686 (Okla. 1956), 341 P.2d 591 (Okla. 1959);
Luttrell v. Parker Drilling Co., 341 P.2d 244 (Okla. 1959).
"SSee Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 304 S.W.2d 362 (1957);
Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 271 S.W.2d 410 (1954); Robinson Drilling Co. v. Moses, 256 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); West Cent. Drilling Co. v.
Malone, 219 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
19See Keeton & Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 Texas L. Rev. 1
(1956).
" See Lynn v. Maag, 220 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1955); Wohlford v. American Gas Prod.
Co., 218 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1955); Pure Oil Co. v. Gear, 183 Okla. 489, 83 P.2d 389
(1938); Weaver v. Reed, 303 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Placid Oil Co. v. Lee,
243 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Truesdell, 187
S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Carter v. Simmons, 178 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.
1944); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Liberty Gravel & Sand Co., 128 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939).
2' 153 Tex. 465, 469, 271 S.W.2d 410, 413 (1954).
22 132 S.W.2d 553, 562 (Tex. 1939), opinion withdrawn, 139 Tex. 183, 164 S.W.2d
488 (1942).
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develop the land and operate it for oil and gas. For that purpose he
may drill wells, construct necessary pits, roads, and the like. Thus,
a tenant in common may himself or by lease to another utilize or
sell the oil or gas discovered on the common land. However, he is
subject to a duty to account to his cotenant for a fractional interest
in the royalty or for the latter's proportionate share of the value of
the oil produced less a proportionate share of the expenses of production and development.23
C. Rights Of The Lessee
In some cases the question of whether the use being made of the
surface is reasonable is one of fact for the jury. This is true only if
there could be a reasonable difference of opinion about the particular
operation in question. As a result, the courts have quite properly
held certain uses reasonable and -necessary as a matter of law."
As examples in this area, it has been held that the lessee has the
right of entry upon and over the land." No buildings may be
placed on the land which will interfere with this right of ingress and
egress.2" The lessee can locate and build the roads where he and his
experts decide proper." He can then oil the roads to make them suitable for transportation of the heavy machinery and equipment needed for drilling the wells."8 In a case involving these problems, Gulf
23Davis v. Atlantic Oil Prod. Co., 87 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1936); Prairie Oil & Gas Co.
v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924); Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal. 2d
637, 52 P.2d 237 (1935); Robinson v. Southwestern Dev. Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 1, 277
P.2d 825 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Little v. Mountain View Dairies, 200 P.2d 576 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 208 P.2d 361 (Cal. 1949), 35 Cal. 2d 232,
217 P.2d 416 (1950); Reward Oil Co. v. White, 333 Ill. App. 241, 77 N.E.2d 436 (1948);
Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co. v. Hatfield, 260 Ky. 315, 85 S.W.2d 672 (1935); Hochsprung
v. Stevenson, 82 Mont. 222, 266 Pac. 406 (1928); Harper v. Ford, 317 P.2d 210, (Okla.
1957); Swearingen v. Oldham, 195 Okla. 532, 159 P.2d 247 (1945); Earp v. MidContinent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okla. 86, 27 P.2d 855 (1933); Wilson v. Superior Oil
Co., 274 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.; Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co.,
147 S.W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), afl'd, 108 Tex. 555, 195 S.W. 1139 (1917).
24 See 4 Summers, op. cit. supra note 8, at § 652; Keeton & Jones, supra note 19; Keeton
& Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry II, 39 Texas L. Rev. 253 (1961);
McMahon, Rights and Liabilities With Respect to Surface Usage by Mineral Lessees, Sw.
Leg. Found. 6th Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax. 231 (1955); Sellers, How Dominant Is the
Dominant Estate? Or, Surface Damages Revisited, Sw. Leg. Found. 13th Inst. on Oil & Gas
L. & Tax. 377 (1962); Comment, Land Uses Permitted an Oil and Gas Lessee, 37 Texas
L. Rev. 889 (1959); Comment, Use of the Surface Fee by the Mineral Operator, 32 Miss.
L.J. 104 (1960); Comment, Implied Rights of the Oil and Gas Owner in the Surface, 26
Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 277 (1954); 7 Baylor L. Rev. 188 (1955); 26 Tul. L. Rev. 522 (1952).
2 Martin v. Dale, 180 Ark. 321, 21 S.W.2d 428 (1929); Westmoreland & Cambria
Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 Atl. 724 (1889); Squires v. Lafferty, 95
W. Va. 307, 121 S.E. 90 (1924).
" Cozart v. Crenshaw, 299 S.W. 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
27Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walton, 317 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Cozart v. Crenshaw, supra note 26.
2
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Donelson, 189 Okla. 273, 116 P.2d 721 (1941).
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9 a Texas court recognized
Oil Corp. v. Walton,"
and gave preference
to the testimony of an oil company's experts over that of the land
owner's rancher witnesses, declaring:

Taking the testimony of appellees' [lessor's] witnesses at its most
optimistic interpretation and highest value, we find only that there
were some so-called existing roads, or old roads. The witnesses testifying were ranchers, and admittedly did not know if the roads were
usable for any heavy machinery or the demands that appellant might
make upon them. . . . In the first place, most of the roads have already
been built; and in the second place, admittedly there are no roads to
some of the proposed drill sites; and thirdly, there is no evidence that
the roads once used are feasible and economical under this water flood
spotting plan or development ...
Therefore, we believe and hold that appellant's [lessee's] second point
is well taken, in that appellees failed to prove that the road program
of appellant contemplated an unreasonable use of the surface. . .. "
The lessee may dig slush pits and drainage ditches for the drilling
of wells and the production of oil or gas."' He can construct any

and all earthen tanks necessary and incidental to his operations."
He can cut and remove trees for drill sites, roads, and tank batteries."3
He can pipe salt water across the land." He can dig for, take, and
use the caliche for roads and drill sites."3
In Joyner v. R. H. Dearing & Sons," the lessee claimed the right
to erect a house and outbuildings. It asserted that they were necessary
in order to keep an employee upon the land for the purposes of
properly taking care of its machinery and equipment and protecting
such property from damage by fire and theft. The court held that
the erection of such buildings was reasonably necessary and said, "If
the oil is to be produced and sold profitably, the instruments and
instrumentalities of production, storage, and transportation must
be
'
safeguarded against loss by theft and fire and other causes. n
29317 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
'ld. at 263-64.
31 Conway v. Skelly Oil Co., 54 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1931); Powell Briscoe, Inc. v. Peters,
269 P.2d 787 (Okla. 1954); Pitzer & West v. Williamson, 159 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942) error dism.
32LeCroy v. Barney, 12 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1926); Indian Territory Illuminating Oil
Co. v. Dunnivant, 183 Okla. 233, 80 P.2d 225 (1938); Meyer v. Cox, 252 S.W.2d 207
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref.; Placid Oil Co. v. Lee, 243 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951).
33Le Croy v. Barney, supra note 32; Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co. v. Crum, 258 Ky. 508,
80 S.W.2d 537 (1935).
"Miller v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 309 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
32B. L. McFarland Drilling Co. v. Connell, 344 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on
other grounds, 162 Tex. 345, 347 S.W.2d 565 (1961).
36
3 112 S.W.2d 1109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
7id. at 1112.
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It has been decided that the operator can select the time of drilling
even though such time would involve an unusual expense to the
lessor. In Robinson Drilling Co. v. Moses, 8 a Texas court permitted

the operator to go upon the land and drill just before a cotton crop
matured.
Further, and even more important, if the number of cases involving the question is any criterion, unless restricted by the lease,

the operator has the right to select the place for drilling. He cannot
be questioned by the lessor in the exercise of his choice nor will his
judgment be reviewed by the courts. In Grimes v. Goodman Drilling
Co., 9 the lease covered town lots. It provided that the drilling of one
well on any one of the lots would hold the lease upon all. The plaintiff bought a house and lot subject to the lease, his grantor retaining
all of the royalty. The defendant lessees erected a derrick on the
front part of the lot, placed a slush pit along the side of the house,
and located the engine and boiler so close to the house that it was
impossible for the plaintiff to live in the house while drilling was
being conducted. The plaintiff sought an injunction, claiming that
the noise and grease were annoying, that the derrick was dangerous
in that it might be blown upon the house, that there was a great
danger of fire and explosion, that it was necessary to close all the
doors and windows on one side of the house in order to keep out the
oil which splashed out of the slush pit, and that the house could be
entered only through the rear door because of the derrick and pits.
The court refused the injunction.
It has been said that this ruling of the Texas court "seems particularly harsh and demonstrates the complete indifference some courts
displayed towards surface rights."4 However, this argument overlooks the fact that the lessees had the right and the desire to drill
the well; they had given consideration and acquired the lease for
the purpose of drilling and producing the oil; the location chosen
was proper for the production of oil, as determined by the lessees'
experts; and there was no evidence that the slush pit or derrick could
have been placed elsewhere on the lot and still fulfill the purposes
for which they were designed. As the court stated:
The plaintiff in this case had no interest in the development of the
block for oil, but his grantor, who still owns his pro rata part of the
royalty, did have such interest, and the other lessors and lessees and
their assignees have an interest in the development of said territory to
'8256 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
'0 216 S.W. 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) error dism.
40 Comment, supra note 24, at 893.
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the fullest extent for oil and gas. In purchasing the lot, as we think,
plaintiff must be presumed to have known that the lessees had the right
to sink a well on his lot, and that thereby he and his family, if occupying the premises, would be subject to more or less inconvenience and
perhaps some danger while said drilling was going on. But he bought
the premises so burdened, and has no just ground for complaint by
reason of the entry upon his premises and the drilling of the well.4 '

The same complaint was made as to the location of wells in Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Walton,42 except that the lease there covered large, sandy,
and comparatively barren ranch lands. The lease operator had proposed a program of secondary recovery operations by water flooding
of the oil sands. The rancher wanted to choose the drill sites and
insisted that the operator use existing roads. The appellate court in
dissolving an injunction granted by the trial court stated:
A water flooding plan calls for a geometric spotting of wells for the
intake of water, in order to recover a better percentage of oil from
the wells as producers. Upon its lease, the appellant had the right to
water flood this property, and that right carried with it the further
right to do it in the manner, and on the locations, thought most feasible by its experts...
With regard to appellees' [lessors'] claim that appellant [lessee]
should use drill sites that had been used for other wells, now abandoned,
we do not find merit in this position, as we believe the holder of the

mineral estate has the right to put his wells where he wants to, and
that does not mean that he shall be forced to use or try to utilize
abandoned wells, or that he must drill so close to such abandoned wells
that he can utilize all or part of the former drill site. We believe it
would be an unwarranted restriction on the rights and privileges held
by the holder of the mineral estate, as he is presumed to know from
exploration in this section and expert testimony, the best place, or the
place in his best judgment where he wants to drill his well.43
To the same effect are decisions of the federal," California,45 and
Mississippi courts."6 A North Carolina court has gone so far as to
hold that an operator can have the house and other buildings of
the surface owner moved for the location and drilling of the well.4"
There are, however, some decisions which seem to question the
lessee's right to locate his wells and roads where he thinks best. In
Mary Oil & Gas Co v. Raines, s an Oklahoma court appears to have
41 Grimes v. Goodman Drilling Co., 216 S.W. 202, 204
42 317 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).

(Tex. Civ. App. 1919).

" Id. at 263-64.
v. Maag, 220 F.2d 703 (Sth Cit. 1955); MacDonnell v. Capital Co., 130
F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 692 (1942).
4 Kidwell v. General Petroleum Corp., 212 Cal. 720, 300 Pac. 1 (1931).
46 Westmoreland v. California Co., 240 Miss. 562, 128
So. 2d 113 (1961).
47English v. Harris Clay Co., 225 N.C. 467, 35 S.E.2d 329 (1945).
46108 Okla. 222, 235 Pac. 1085 (1925).
44 Lynn
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announced a rule much the same as that followed by the courts of
Texas, California, and the other states. However, in Gulf Pipe Line
Co. v. Pawnee-Tulsa Petroleum Co." the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held that a lessee could not arbitrarily locate the well in a place
where it would endanger the property and life of those on the surface when another location was shown to be equally advantageous.
In Denver Prod. & Ref. Co. v. Meeker,"0 the plaintiff's petition
alleged an unreasonable use of the surface by the lessee's building of
unnecessary roads and its driving of heavily loaded vehicles across
the land. Plaintiff, a dairyman, testified that some of the roads were
unnecessary. Plaintiff also produced other laymen who testified that
they were familiar with oil field practices and that the roads were
not needed. The testimony of the oil company and its "expert"
witnesses was to the contrary, yet the Oklahoma court upheld a
jury verdict for the plaintiff. This handling of the question appears
to be against the weight of authority.
One of the Texas courts has held that the oil and gas lessee may
not, without -notice, move piles of commercial sand mined by a
subsequent sand and gravel lessee in order to locate a well where the
sand and gravel had been stored." This is not contrary to the other
Texas decisions, because the court recognized that the lessee had the
right "in the exercise of due care . ..to drill oil wells 'wherever it
might choose in the development of the premises.' ".. It declared
that the lessee had the right to use such part of the surface as might
be necessary to drill the wells and in the exercise of that right could
drill a well at the very point where the sand pile was located. But
the court said that the lessee could take possession of the sand only
by lawful means, and that, by seizing and moving the sand without
notice to its owner and without demand that such owner move the
same, the lessee had committed a "trespass."
II. THE

RIGHT

To

USE WATER AND GAS

In addition to those land uses most frequently litigated in the
past, a different sphere of activities by oil and gas lessees is becoming
the subject of judicial attention, because of the development of newer
recovery methods. The right to produce and use water and gas for
drilling, production, and secondary recovery operations has been before the courts now on several occasions.
49 34 Okla. 775, 127 Pac. 252 (1912).
50199 Okla. 588, 188 P.2d 858 (1948).
" Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Liberty Gravel & Sand Co.,
App. 1939).
12id.

at 473.

128 S.W.2d 471

(Tex. Civ.
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The courts of Kansas, 3 Oklahoma,' South Carolina," and Texas"
have held that a lessee can use such water as is reasonably necessary

in his operations. In Holt v. Southwest Antioch Sand Unit, Fifth
Enlarged,' an Oklahoma court held that a lessee had the right, as
against the surface owner, to use so much of the salt water produced from the premises as was reasonably necessary for production
of the minerals, including the use of such salt water for secondary
recovery of oil produced off the premises or within the unit which
included the premises. The court said:
Here plantiff alleged that defendant was using the water "to increase
the amount and life of production of oil and gas" and that "the
manner of the use of the same is and was to force the salt water into
and against the producing oil pool and to force the oil to the bottom

of the well and thus force the same to the surface." It would be
difficult to conceive of a use of the water more essentially a part of
the operation of mining and removing the petroleum minerals from
under said lands.'
In Stradley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co." the mineral and surface
estates had been severed. It was held in an action by the surface
owner that the lessee of the mineral owner had the right to use as
much of the surface, including the water, as was necessary for drilling
and producing oil. The Texas court declared:
The testimony shows that the Magnolia went upon the land and
drilled a water well for the purpose of securing water to drill an oil
well, prospect for and develop its mineral rights. They obtained the
water from this well which they used in drilling and operating for oil
on the lease....
It is unnecessary for us to determine whether water is a mineral
since we believe that the reservation in the deeds by implication retained to the Southwest [owner of the mineral estate] the right to use
the amount of water from the land reasonably necessary to enable it
to develop the mineral rights; this it sold and transferred to the Magnolia.6"
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed this case,
stating that there is "abundant authority for the proposition that
the owner of mineral rights is entitled to take from the land and
Wyckoff v. Brown, 135 Kan. 460, 11 P.2d 718 (1932).
4Holt v. Southwest Antioch Sand Unit, Fifth Enlarged, 292 P.2d 998 (Okla. 1956).
"Natural
Light & Thorium Co. v. Alexander, 85 S.C. 306, 67 S.E. 310 (1910).
6
' Stradley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 155 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App 1941) error ref.
:3

57292 P.2d 998 (Okla. 1956).
'1 Id. at 1000.
5' 155 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref.
'lid. at 652.
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use that amount of water which is reasonably necessary for the
exploitation of the mineral rights."61
In this connection, a Kentucky court distinguished water used off
the premises from that used for lease operations. It held that a lessee
could use water for water flooding but had to pay damages for water
taken and used off the leased premises." An Oklahoma court, on the
other hand, has held that a lessee could not, for either purpose, use
impounded by the lessor in an artificial pond for agricultural
water
68
use.
It has also been held that a lessee can use gas found on the premises
for operations on those premises. In Guffey v. Stroud"4 a Texas court
said the right to take oil carried with it the right to tap gas pockets,
even though the gas was owned by a different lessee, and to bring to
the surface so much gas as was necessary to drill for oil.
In Armstrong v. Skelly Oil Co.65 the plaintiffs sued for an accounting of royalties on gas. Nine wells produced oil and gas. One
well produced only gas. All of the gas was used to increase the
flow of oil from the nine oil wells by injecting it into the casing. As
a result only wet or casinghead gas was produced with the oil. The
Fifth Circuit held, "There is no doubt that appellees [lessees] had
the right to use all the gas produced on the land without cost, as it
was reasonably necessary to properly work the property and to recover the oil produced in the most economical manner."66 Ten years
later, in Dunn v. Republic Natural Gas Co.67 the plaintiffs sued for
an accounting for gas taken and produced with the oil, which gas
had been used for "jetting" as a part of repressuring operations conducted by the operator. A master, who had been appointed to take
and report the evidence, found that the use of the gas for jetting
was necessary and proper in order to obtain maximum production of
oil. However, the court said that these were not ordinary oil producing operations. The rights of the lessor would not be determined
by the use to which the gas was put, that is, whether held for sale
or for reworking the wells. The court then held that since there was
a "showing that the use of the gas for 'jetting' was reasonable and
for benefit of both plaintiffs and defendants, plaintiffs [could not]
61 Russell v. Texas Co., 238 F.2d 636, 644

(9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 938

(1957).

62Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1960).
63Mohawk Drilling Co. v. Wolf, 262 P.2d 892 (Okla. 1953).
64 16 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).

6555 F.2d 1066 (5th Cit. 1932).
66

Id. at 1068.

67 124 F.2d 128 (5th Cit. 1941), cerl. denied, 315 U.S. 821

(1942).
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complain of the use by defendants but only of its failure to pay the
plaintiffs for its part of the gas so used, the reasonable value thereof."
It would appear that in the Dunn case"9 the court refused to recognize that it was "reasonably necessary" to repressure the oil wells
and that for such necessary operations the lessee was freely entitled
to take and use the gas. The more realistic view is that expressed by

the Tenth Circuit in Utilities Prod. Corp. v. Carter Oil Co.,"' where
the court said:
When an oil well plays out, it is not because all the oil has been
recovered, but because the gas or water pressure has been exhausted.
'When the strata overlying an oil sand is penetrated by the drill, the
gas within the formation, being under pressure, seeks the outlet, carrying with it the oil. When that pressure is gone, there is nothing left to
bring the oil within reach of the pump, except gravity, the operation
of which is limited to upper strata of the sand, and there counteracted by properties of viscosity, capillarity and adhesion of oil to its
mother sand. Oil is produced by the lateral thrust of the gas pressure
to the hole, and, after it quits flowing, the vertical lift of the oil to
the top by a pump. Many years ago it was conceived that played-out
wells could be given a new lease on life by injecting gases or liquids
under pressure into the oil sands, thus starting the cycle anew. This is
accomplished by forcing gases or liquids into one of the exhausted wells
on a lease, or into a master-hole drilled for the purpose. The gas, seeking an avenue of escape, percolates through the sands to the outletsthe other wells on the lease-carrying oil with it ...
The operation or development of an oil lease requires that the oil in
the sands be brought to the top of the ground. Moving the oil laterally
is as an important a part of the work as moving it vertically. It is
conceded that residue gas may be used to lift it from the bottom of
the hole; no reason is suggested why moving it to the bottom of the
hole is not likewise a part of the operation or development of a lease.7"
Thus, the better rule seems to be that a lessee should have the right
to use the gas in the jetting operation without having to account

to the lessor for the value of the gas used.
It also should be mentioned that water can be used as well as gas
by means of a process known as water flooding. Writers have defined
the water flooding process and described its legal aspects as follows:
Water flooding [is] the deliberate, controlled injection of water into

an oil-producing stratum for the purpose of increasing the percentage
and rate of recovery of oil from the stratum. It is thus to be distinguished from those operations which have for their purpose only the
disposal of salt water obtained in producing oil. Its function is to re68Ibid.
6972 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1934).
70

1 d. at 659.
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cover oil which would not be otherwise recoverable by primary pro-

duction methods. It is what is known as a secondary recovery method,
and by this is meant a method which obtains recovery through increase
in reservoir energy by the injection of liquids or gases into the reservoir
after the original reservoir energy has been dissipated, and usually, but
not always, after the primary recovery period has been terminated.
Where there is no pooling of production by lessees cooperating in a
water flooding project, it would probably be unnecessary to secure a
lessor's consent to such a project, on the grounds that flooding is a
legitimate production method which a lessee, in his reasonable discretion, may adopt. The right to use water for lease operations, even
water produced on leased premises, is a right which is usually granted
expressly in the ordinary oil and gas lease, and implied where not
granted in a conveyance or reservation, but there might be a question
whether such a use of water was in contemplation of the parties to
such an instrument."1 Nevertheless, since a lessee is required to use due
diligence in operating the leased premises, there would seemingly be
not only the right, but the obligation as well, on the part of the lessee
to adopt any reasonable method of increasing production."2

III. THE RIGHT To CONDUCT GEOPHYSICAL EXPLORATION
The science of locating subsurface structures or formations favorable to the accumulation of oil or gas by geophysical exploration
has progressed to such a stage that the right to explore by such
methods is now quite valuable. It is a right vested in the owner of
the mineral estate, although he may confer it upon another. 3 It was
held in a Texas case74 that a landowner who had executed an oil and
gas lease retained no right to resell the geophysical privilege and that
the lessee had the exclusive right to prospect or contract for the
prospecting of the premises. There would seem to be no doubt about
the exclusiveness of this right if the lease expressly grants "the

exclusive right to prospect." However, where the right is not expressly granted, the question as to whether the lessee has the sole

right to explore is still not settled in all jurisdictions. One commentator has presented arguments both for and against placing the
sole right of prospecting in the lessee but concludes that the lessee
should probably not have that right." If the criterion of determi71

See text accompanying notes 42, 59 supra.

" Brown & Myers, Some Legal Aspects of Water Flooding, 24 Texas L. Rev. 456 (1946).
" See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Whitaker, 257 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1958); Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957); Yates v. Gulf Oil Corp., 182 F.2d 286
(5th Cir. 1950); Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943); Shell Petroleum
Corp. v. Scully, 71 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1934); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Moore, 46 F.2d
959 (5th Cir. 1931); Wilson v. Texas Co., 237 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Wimberly, 181 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
4
" Wilson v. Texas Co., 237 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref. n.r.e.
" Hull, Oil and Gas Lessee v. Seismograph Licensee, 21 Okla. B.A.J. 1503 (1950); see
also Comment, supra note 24, at 902.
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nation is the good of the industry, then just as the right to drill and
produce has been held to belong exclusively to the lessee, it is
believed that the courts should and probably will hold that the
right to prospect by geophysical explorations is exclusively that of
the lessee.

IV.

THE RIGHT TO SUBJACENT SUPPORT BY THE LESSOR

Some brief mention should be made of the rights of a lessor as
to subjacent support. The question for consideration is whether a
lessor has the right to demand compensation for subsidence after
executing a lease. One early Texas lawyer and writer was of the
opinion that "the surface owner [was] entitled as a matter of
absolute right to subjacent support, and the mineral owner [was]
responsible in damages for subsidence caused by his operations whether
negligent or not." 6 However, this is not now the rule in Texas. Recently the Texas Supreme Court adopted, in effect, the opinion of a
court of civil appeals in Kenny v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,77 in
which the plaintiff, the owner of the surface estate, sued the defendant, the owner of the oil, gas, and mineral lease, for damages
for subsidence. The court declared:
There is no contention or question of negligence in the instant case,
and we think that since the defendant had the right to produce the
sulphur under its lease, and since it is stipulated that subsidence was a
natural, normal, inevitable result of getting the sulphur by the only
commercially known process, that defendant's conduct and acts in
producing the sulphur are authorized by its lease, and that the plaintiff's right to have her land free of subsidence, was one of the 78rights
disposed of by her predecessor in title, when the lease was made.

This rule applied by the Texas court is contrary to the usual
doctrine of subjacent support found in the coal mining cases."
V.

THE LESSEE'S DUTY TO THE LESSOR

Up to this point, this Article has dealt with the rights of surface
use which an oil and gas lessee will, or may, have protected by the
courts. These are the affirmative rights of surface use, that is, what
76 Masterson, Adverse Possession and the Severed Mineral Estate, 25 Texas L. Rev. 139,
145 (1946).
7351 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref.
'lid. at 614.
" See Marquette Cement Mining Co. v. Oglesby Coal Co., 253 Fed. 107 (N.D, Ill.
1918); Drummond v. White Oak Fuel Co., 104 W. Va. 368, 140 S.E. 57 (1927); Cole v.
Signal Knob Coal Co., 95 W. Va. 702, 122 S.E. 268 (1924); 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals
S 278 (1948); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1309 (1953).
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the lessee can lawfully do. However, there is an equally important
area of consideration, that is, what the lessee can refrain from doing

because of the lack of any duty on his part. Before reaching any
question of possible lessee negligence, there is always the necessity
of first determining whether there was any legal duty owed by the
lessee to the lessor.
A lessee is under no duty to fence slush pits, pumps, or ditches;
this is apparently the universally applied rule."0 Therefore, as long
as the surface used for such purposes is reasonable in area, a lessee
should have no liability for damages to the surface or to cattle coming
within that area unless he commits an intentional or wilful injury.
In Pitzer & West v. Williamson" a lessee had left open an unguarded
slush pit containing oil and waste material. The surface tenant sued
for damages to his sheep resulting from their drinking the material
in the pit. A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on the ground
that there was no duty on the part of the lessee to fence the pit. In
Carter v. Simmons" the plaintiff sued for damages for death of his
cattle from drinking oil permitted to escape by the lessee. It was
claimed that the lessee had negligently permitted the oil storage
tanks to overflow. There was also evidence that the lessee had maintained unfenced slush pits. There was no proof showing whether the
cattle had died as the result of drinking the oil in the slush pits or
that which had escaped from the tank. The court held that since the
lessee was under no duty to fence the slush pits, the judgment of
the trial court for the plaintiff landowner would be reversed. In
Sinclair Prairie Oil v. Perry,8 suit was brought by the surface tenant
for the value of two mares which had died as a result of drinking a
poisonous chemical found in the slush pit. A judgment for the
plaintiff was reversed, again with the holding that the lessee was
under no duty to fence the slush pit. Trinity Prod. Co. v. Bennett84
8 Benefiel v. Pure Oil Co., 322 Ill. App. 5, 53 N.E.2d 726 (1944); Grenard v. Ports,
298 P.2d 430 (Okla. 1956); Wellsville Oil Co. v. Carver, 206 Okla. 181, 242 P.2d 151
(1952); Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Rhodes, 205 Okla. 651, 240 P.2d 95 (1951);
Pure Oil Co. v. Gear, 183 Okla. 489, 83 P.2d 389 (1938); Warren Petroleum Corp. v.
Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 271 S.W.2d 410 (1954); Parker v. Texas Co., 326 S.W.2d 579
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.; Shelburne v. Christie-Hickman Drilling Co., 295
S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Martinez v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp., 274 S.W.2d 160
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Conner v. Chatman, 272 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954);
Trinity Prod. Co. v. Bennett, 258 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Baker v. Davis, 211
S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Perry, 191 S.W.2d 484
(Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Carter v. Simmons, 178 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944);
Pitzer & West v. Williamson, 159 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error dism.
81 Note 80 supra.
82 178 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
8a 191 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
84258 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
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was a suit for damages for the death of a cow which had been caught
in a moving oil well pump. A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed, because the lessee was held to be under no duty to fence or
put any guards around the pumping equipment.
These decisions denied recovery against an operator either on the
ground that he was under no duty to fence the wells, pits, and
machinery or on the ground that the livestock were trespassers and,
therefore, the operator's only duty was not to injure them wilfully
or wantonly. The cases appear to sustain the interpretation given
them by Justice Smith in his dissenting opinion in Brown v. Lundeli, 8 5 where he said:
Under the authorities, as I interpret them, the oil and gas lessee has
the right to take without paying damages a part of the surface of the
land for drilling operations, and the lessee is not liable to the lessor
or his tenant for a negligent use of that land so long as he takes no
more than is reasonably necessary. The lessee's only liability, admitting
that the part of the premises taken is reasonably necessary, is for wilful,
intentional or wanton destruction of the lessor's property....
The opinion of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Weaver v.
Reed'" appears to be in direct conflict with the foregoing decisions.
Reed owned and operated a cattle ranch. He claimed that five of
his cattle had consumed a pipe lubricant from an open bucket left
near the well and from pipes stacked at the well and that as a result
they had died. The jury found that the lessee's employee had left
open a bucket containing pipe lubricant, that it contained elements
injurious to cattle, that the cattle had eaten the lubricant, and that
leaving the bucket open was negligence and a proximate cause of
the death of the cattle. The court said that if lubricating the pipe
at the well was a necessary incident to the operation of the well,
the lessee was not liable for damages caused thereby, but in remanding the case for a new trial stated: "In this case Weaver [the
lessee] had no duty to fence the area reasonably necessary for the
oil operations provided for in his lease. But, it does not follow that
he was not required to exercise ordinary care in producing oil and
maintaining that area.""8
It is now rather generally recognized that the lessee has no duty
to clean up and restore the surface after a reasonable use, unless
the lease expressly imposes such an obligation." The Texas Supreme
85 162 Tex. 85, 97, 344 S.W.2d 863, 872 (1961).
88303 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
87

Id. at 810.

8See McLeod v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 131

F.2d 242

F. Supp. 449 (D. Kan. 1955), aff'd, 233

(10th Cir. 1956); Duvanel v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 170 Kan. 483, 227 P.2d 88
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Court made this holding in the Monzingo case." In discussing the
0
Louisiana case of Smith v. Schuster," which has often been argued

as holding to the contrary, the Texas court said:
In Smith v. Schuster, 66 So.2d 430, 431, Louisiana Court of Appeal,
so far as the plaintiff's cause of action was concerned, the Court says
that the only question presented for consideration is whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of damages. The Court goes on to say,
however, that "He (the mineral lessee) should maintain and restore
the premises in the condition he found them subject to his rightful
" We do not think this statement of law supports respondent's
use ..
contention of implied duty to repair the damage done to the land
caused by rightful and necessary use."

It has been argued that the courts could hold a lessee to an
implied duty to restore the surface and that they have exhibited a
"disregard for the lessor's rights in an unwarranted fashion" by
holding that the lessor impliedly grants away the right to have the
expensive restoration operations performed by the lessee.9" However, it would seem that this argument is answered by a Kansas
court in Duvanel v. Sinclair Ref. Co." That court stated:
Since by the terms of the lease the lessee had the right to construct
the improvements that it did and to remove them at its option, with
no right on the part of lessor to require removal, lessor cannot be
heard to complain because of only partial removal, in the absence of
negligence in accomplishing such partial removal, and there is no

implied covenant on the part of lessee to restore the premises in question to their original condition.

Finally, it should be mentioned that a lessee is under no duty to
give notice to the landowner or his tenant of his going upon the

premises to explore, drill, or develop it.9"
VI.

PROHIBITIONS ON THE LESSOR'S USE OF THE SURFACE

In addition to certain affirmative rights of surface use for his own
purposes, and in addition to certain negative rights of non-action in
(1951); Fox v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 201 Okla. 17, 200 P.2d 398 (1948); Black Gold
Petroleum Co. v. Hill, 188 Okla. 329, 108 P.2d 784 (1940); Warren Petroleum Corp. v.
Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 304 S.W.2d 362 (1957); Comment, Ditty of an Oil and Gas
Lessee To Restore the Surface, 1 Kan. L. Rev. 185 (1952).

89Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, supra note 88.
9066 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 1953).
91Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 482, 304 S.W.2d 362, 363
(1957).
2
" See Comment, Land Uses Permitted an Oil and Gas Lessee, 37 Texas L. Rev. 889, 898
(1959).
93 170 Kan. 483, 227 P.2d 88 (1951).
9'Gulf Oil Corp. v. Whitaker, 257 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1958); Parker v. Texas Co.,
326 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.
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connection with his own activities, an oil and gas lessee also has a
protectible legal interest in the lessor's surface use insofar as that use
affects the mineral estate. Thus, a lessee can prevent the landowner
from using the property for a cemetery."5 A lessee can prevent the
construction of a refinery on the premises if he shows that it will
probably interfere with his operations.' He can also prevent the
damming and inundating of the property if it will interfere with
his operations." On the other hand, until notified that the lessee
intends to drill or otherwise use the land, a lessor may put it to any
proper use and such use may not be prevented by the lessee."8
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Wood9" is an unusual case in that
Humble was in the position of a surface owner and was joined with
other surface owners as a defendant in the suit. After the lease was
taken by the plaintiff Wood, the defendant surface owners erected
a dam and flooded the premises with water. Wood claimed that the
flooding of the property with water made it practically impossible
for him to operate and explore the lease. He alleged that the use
being made of the property destroyed its commercial value. In denying the plaintiff any relief the court held that Wood had not been
damaged by the construction of the dam and the placing of the
water upon the land at the time such condition was created. However, the court simultaneously said that the lessee Wood had the
right to explore the land for oil at any time he saw fit, and when
called upon to do so, the surface owners were under a duty to permit
the lessee to exercise his rights without hindrance or inconvenience.
In the Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Bright & Schiff case,' 0' Atlantic sought
to enjoin the use of the surface by one of its competitors, Bright &
Schiff, which sought to come on the land with consent of the surface
owner to locate its equipment, pumps, tanks, and pit incident to the
drilling of a well to be bottomed under the adjacent lot. In denying
the injunction, the court said:
It becomes apparent, therefore, that a lessee who would enjoin surface
uses by a lessor, or another under his lessor, must prove that the use
"'Eternal Cemetery Corp. v. Tammen, 324 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error
ref. n.r.e.
9" Cozart v. Crenshaw, 299 S.W. 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
97 Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Wood, 294 S.W. 197 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927); United
No. & So. Oil Co. v. Mercer, 286 S.W. 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
9' Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Wood, supra note 97; Parker v. Texas Co., 326 S.W.2d 579
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.; Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Bright & Schiff, 321 S.W.2d
167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.;
West Cent. Drilling Co. v. Malone, 219
S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Grubstake Inv. Ass'n v. Coyle, 269 S.W. 854 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1925).
'9294 S.W. 197 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927).
'00 321 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.
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interferes with the reasonable exercise of his own rights under his own
lease. To do this he must prove that he needs the surface at the time
and place then being used by the other user. 1'
There has been considerable argument concerning the rights of a
lessee with respect to the surface where there are prior surface leases
outstanding. Writers of law review articles have generally taken the
position that if an agricultural lease becomes effective before the oil
and gas lease, the oil and gas lessee cannot interfere in any way with
the possession and use of the surface by the agricultural lessee until
the expiration of the term of that lease."' An Oklahoma court has
so held in Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Melson."3 A Texas court has
0"
now held, however, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cargill,
that
whether or not the agricultural lease was prior in time to the mineral
lease, the owner of the fee, having retained the mineral estate following the surface lease, also retained the right to use the surface.
Accordingly, when the mineral estate was leased and conveyed, the
easements and the right to use the surface for the mineral development were conveyed as well. One commentator felt that the court
had applied the correct principle."'
Another important attribute of the rights owned by a lessee is that
the lessor cannot subdivide or otherwise sell part of the leased premises so as to restrict the lessee in his operations; a lessee can ignore
any such subdivision."' In Stephenson v. Glass... a court said that the
owner of the surface could subdivide the leased premises but that
he had no power to restrict "the right of the lessee to operate at will
upon the premises without reference to such subdivision...... The
court said that the purchaser of any part of the subdivision took the
same estate that his vendor had, "no more, no less." The court added
that such purchaser "could not require the lessee to drill any more
or other wells, or upon other locations or particular locations, not
required of the lessee while the whole acreage embraced in the
"0'

Id. at 169.

"' See Keeton & Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 Texas L. Rev.

1, 5 (1956); McMahon, Rights and Liabilities With Respect to Surface Usage by Mineral
Leases, Sw. Leg. Found. 6th Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax. 231 (1955); Comment, supra
note 92; 7 Baylor L. Rev. 188 (1955).
"o 274 P.2d 543 (Okla. 1954).
104 340 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
"a.See 13 Oil & Gas Rep. 1049 (1960); see also Sellers, How Dominant is the Dominant
Estate? Or, Surface Damages Revisited, Sw. Leg. Found. 13th Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax.
377 (1962).
"°'See Conway v. Skelly Oil Co., 54 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1931); Siemon v. Russell, 15
Cal. Rep. 218 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Stephenson v. Glass, 276 S.W. 1110 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925), aff'd,
115 Tex. 192, 279 S.W. 260 (1926).
107

Note 106 supra.

"'ild. at 1113.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

(4

1
lease was intact.""'
In Conway v. Skelly Oil Co."° a promoter had
contracted with the lessor to plot and subdivide the premises.
Sales were booming until the oil lessee posted large signs on the
premises listing its express and implied lease rights and stating that
it would enforce these rights by litigation. The sales stopped and the
promoter brought suit against the lessee for unjustifiable interference
with his business. The court held that the permanent improvements
would interfere with the lessee's right to occupy the premises. It
said that the terms of the lease implied that the lessor would do
nothing in improving the land that would destroy or seriously interfere with the oil lessee's right to enter and exploit the minerals. Moreover, the court said that the lessee's bizarre tactics were justified in
protection of its legal rights.
Notwithstanding the rights of user recognized in a lessee, it must

be remembered that a lessee does not have the right to use the surface
of the premises in aid of drilling operations on other lands."' In
Russell v. Texas Co."' a federal court said, "It is a well established
principle of property law that the right to use the surface of land as
an incident to the ownership of mineral rights in the land, does not
carry with it the right to use the surface in aid of mining or drilling
operations on other lands. ........
VII.

THE RIGHTS OF A LESSOR

At this point it may begin to sound as though there is no question
about the mineral estate being the dominant estate-master of the
servient surface estate. The oil and gas lessee has certain rights to
use the surface. The lessee is legally exempt from doing certain things
and the lessee can control, to some extent, the use of the surface by
the lessor. However, notice must be taken of the protection which
the courts have extended to the lessor, protection which at this time
is so extensive as to raise the question of which estate is dominant in
actual practice.
The general language of nearly every decided case makes it clear,
1o Ibid.
"0 54 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1931).
11 See Ross Coal Co. v. Cole, 249 F.2d 600 (4th Cir. 1957); Russell v. Texas Co., 238
F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 938 (1957); Franz Corp. v. Fifer, 295
Fed. 106 (9th Cir. 1924); Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 11, 100 P.2d 528
(Dist. Ct. App. 1940), 48 Cal. App. 2d 429, 119 P.2d 973 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941), 63 Cal.
App. 2d 201, 146 P.2d 256 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 248 Ill.
App. 623,
1 N.E.2d 419 (1936); Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley; 346 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1960); Rose v. Martin,
310 Ky. 193, 220 S.W.2d 385 (1949); Moore v. Lackey Mining Co., 215 Ky. 71, 284 S.W.
415 (1926); Groves v. Terrace Mining Co., 340 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. 1960).
11"238 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 938 (1957).
'"Id.at 642.
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first, that a lessee can use no more of the surface than is reasonably
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease. This is a basic protection of the surface estate, implied by the courts from the lease
contract. Second, a lessee will be held liable for negligent damage
done to the surface owner's property, depending in most cases upon
whether there has been a use of more of the premises than is reasonably necessary. Third, and now to be considered, some jurisdictions
impose absolute liability on the lessee for certain types of damage.
These three areas of protection, singly or in combination, afford
a formidable defense to any unwarranted invasion of the surface
estate by the oil and gas lessee. The real question today is not whether
adequate protection exists but rather, whether there is too much
protection given the supposedly servient surface estate.
Illustrating this problem is the significant case of Brown v. Lundell."5 4 Time after time it has been said that an operator is not liable
to his lessor for damages done to the surface by the salt water that is
produced with the oil unless the damages proximately result from
negligence in the operation."' It has even been said that the pits used
to store the salt water and other waste may properly cover the whole
surface. ' However, in recent years pollution of fresh water and the
fresh water stratum has become an increasing source of friction and
litigation between the surface owners and the mineral lessees.
It has been often repeated that it is clearly the Texas view that
an operator is not liable for damage caused by the escape of the
deleterious substance without proof of negligence. This is where the
opinion of the Texas Supreme Court in Brown v. Lundell 17 becomes
important. In addition to the securing of the oil and gas lease, the
lessee in that case had paid the plaintiff landowners a separate consideration for the right to construct and maintain a surface salt
water and refuse pit. The salt water produced with the oil was deposited in this pit. The jury found that the lessee had negligently
permitted salt water to escape from this pit and had negligently failed
to protect the fresh water stratum. A court of civil appeals said
that the only duty owed to the plaintiffs by the lessee was to refrain
114 162 Tex. 85, 344 S.W.2d 863 (1961).
115 See Lynn v. Maag, 220 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1955); Phoenix v. Graham, 349 I1. App.
326, 110 N.E.2d 699 (1953); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Davis, 224 Miss. 464, 80 So. 2d 467 (1955);
Powell Briscoe, Inc. v. Peters, 269 P.2d 787 (Okla. 1954); Marland Oil Co. v. Hubbard,
168 Okla. 518, 34 P.2d 278 (1934); Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153 Okla. 137, 5 P.2d 389
(1931); Walters v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 85 Okla. 77, 204 P. 906 (1922); Martinez v.
Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp., 274 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co.
v. Truesdell, 187 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Carter v. Simmons, 178 S.W.2d 743
(Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
" Acidoil Co. v. Mitchell, 191 Okla. 532, 130 P.2d 993 (1942).
11. 162 Tex. 85, 344 S.W.2d 863 (1961).
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from intentionally, willfully, or wantonly injuring the property,
but the court then held that the evidence and the jury findings of
negligence justified a finding and declaring of wanton conduct on
the part of the lessee. The supreme court affirmed the lower decisions
but held that in spite of the language of the court of civil appeals,
the case was one of negligence and had been tried on that basis. The
court distinguished its prior opinion in Warren Petroleum Corp. v.
Martin1 . on the basis that in the Martin case there was no proof of
negligence and there existed no duty to exclude the cattle from the
area of operations. The dissent in Brown v. Lundell was founded
principally on the reasoning that it had not been demonstrated that
the defendant had used more land than reasonably necessary, and
consequently, he could be liable only for wilful, intentional, or
wanton conduct."' The dissent also stated that the majority in
actuality was holding the defendant "absolutely liable," overruling
the long recognized Texas rule of Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co.'
without saying so. Further, the dissent pointed out that under the
prior decision of the court in Taylor v. White,121 proof that the pit
had been maintained in accordance with the universal custom in the
area should have shifted the burden to the plaintiffs to demonstrate
that the custom was in itself negligent.
General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken,"' decided by the court the same
day as Brown v. Lundell, involved pollution of the fresh water
stratum by salt water from pits on the premises, but three specific
acts of negligence were proved and found by the jury. These were
that the defendant had negligently (1) used too small a pit for disposal of the salt water, (2) located the pit uphill from the plaintiff's
fresh water spring, and (3) failed to seal the pit so as to prevent
leakage. In particular, the fact that the lessee used too small a pit
would seem to provide a more satisfactory basis for liability than the
Brown v. Lundell findings. There might well not be a duty to seal
a pit to prevent leakage of salt water, but the lessee might properly
be charged with the duty of constructing a sufficiently large pit to
hold the water and other refuse. Criticism of the majority opinion
in Brown v. Lundell is levied by Justice Smith in his dissent in that
case:
"' 153 Tex. 465, 271 S.W.2d 410 (1954).
.19 162 Tex. 85, 97-99, 344 S.W.2d 863, 872-73 (1961); for a quotation of the relevant
portions of the dissent, see note 3 supra and accompanying text.
'20128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936).
...212 S.W. 656 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919).
121 162 Tex. 104, 344 S.W.2d 668 (1961).
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The court here admits that this case [Warren Petroleum Corp. v.
Monzingo"'] correctly states the law, yet the majority here is willing
to assess damages against petitioners without requiring a finding that
imore land was used than was reasonably necessary. The court has by
implication held that the jury findings of negligence are the equivalent
of findings that the petitioners used more land than was reasonably
necessary.' 24
In some states there is absolute liability for harm resulting from
pollution. Oklahoma is a prime example; there, in addition to common law liability, a statute provides that waste oil and other deleterious substances shall not be permitted to flow over the land."'
Thus, where salt water or other such deleterious substances are permitted to escape from pits or ditches and flow over onto the land,
there is absolute liability."' Under a similar statute the Kansas courts
also enforce strict liability for all such damage done by salt water
or like substances." '
It is, of course, recognized that by special contract the parties may
limit or extend the rights of use of a lessor or a lessee."' The parties
may and often do provide that although the lessee has the right to
use the surface of the land, he shall pay for it or shall be responsible
for any damage done to the land or growing things. It would seem
that this proposition is elemental and need not be repeated here, but
the issue has arisen often between a lessor and his lessee, and the
courts have been constantly called upon to remind the litigants first
to search their leases for the express covenants.
VIII.

"REASONABLY

NECESSARY,"

NEGLIGENCE,

AND

BURDEN OF PROOF

In those cases where the surface owner has produced competent
evidence to establish that there can be a reasonable difference of
opinion, the question of whether a particular use of the premises is
12 157 Tex. 479, 304 S.W.2d 362 (1957).
124162 Tex. at 99, 344 S.W.2d at 873.
12 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 296 (1950).

.. Zarrow v. Hughes, 282 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1955); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Sheel, 208
Okla. 416, 256 P.2d 815 (1953); Texas Co. v. Belvin, 207 Okla. 549, 251 P.2d 804 (1952);
Wellsville Oil Co. v. Carver, 206 Okla. 181, 242 P.2d 151 (1952); Franklin Drilling Co.
v. Jackson, 202 Okla. 687, 217 P.2d 816 (1950).
". See Wendtlandt v. National Co-op. Ref. Ass'n, 168 Kan. 619, 215 P.2d 209 (1950).
12 See Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co. v. Minier, 127 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 669 (1942); Danker v. Lee, 137 Cal. App. 2d 797, 291 P.2d 73
(Dist.

Ct. App.

1955); Oceana Oil Producers

v.

Portland

Silo Co., 229 Ind. 656,

100

N.E.2d 895 (1951); Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Rhodes, 204 Okla. 651, 240 P.2d
95 (1951); Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 Atd.
724 (1889); Hart v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 352 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961)

error ref. n.r.e.; Meyer v. Cox, 252 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref.
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reasonable is for the jury."9 In those decisions so holding, most of
the courts use the term "reasonably necessary." The West Virginia
courts term it "fairly necessary."' 30 However, it is understood that
the terms mean the same thing.
Where the issue is submitted to the jury, it would appear necessary
or, in any event, proper to charge or instruct the jury on the meaning of "reasonably necessary." In the first place, some of the courts
themselves have equivocated in applying the standard to the particular operation in question. In the second place, without such an
instruction or definition, the jury would be left to guess, surmise,
and argue among themselves as to the meaning to be given the term.
Without some assistance from the court, it is probable that a jury
would end up by applying their own standards as farmers, ranchers,
storekeepers, school teachers, and barbers as to what is necessary, in
disregard of the expert testimony of the witnesses for the lease
operator and of the rights conferred upon him by the lease contract.
This important and so often controlling standard or term "reasonably necessary" has been defined so that it "may mean, on the one
hand, less than imperative need, and, on the other, more than mere
suitable convenience."' 31 It has been explained that "reasonably necessary" means that which is practical or reasonably convenient and
is to be distinguished from the more exacting degrees of "absolute"
or "strict" necessity. 32 An Indiana court has said that "the word
'necessary' cannot reasonably be held to be limited to absolute physical necessity.""'1 A Texas court treated the term as encompassing
"toperations in the usual and customary way, consistent with the
purposes for which the land was leased. . . .
When speaking of negligence, the United States Supreme Court
in Washington &q Georgetown R.R. v. McDade' approved of the
established rule that the standard of ordinary and reasonable care is
that degree of care (1) which ordinarily prudent persons (2) engaged in the same kind of business (3) usually exercise under similar
12 See Mazda Oil Corp. v. Gauley, 290 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1955); Warren Petroleum
Corp. v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 304 S.W.2d 362 (1957); Moore v. Decker, 220 S.W.
773 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920); Arnold H. Bruner & Co. v. McCauley, 319 S.W.2d 763
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Joyner v. R. H. Dearing & Sons, 112 S.W.2d 1109 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937); Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co., 73 Wyo. 321, 278 P.2d 798 (1955); Keeton &
Jones, supra note 102, at 4.
13 See Cole v. Ross Coal Co., 150 F. Supp. 808 (D. W. Va.) aff'd, 249 F.2d 600 (4th
Cir. 1957); Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 134 W. Va. 719, 61 S.E.2d 633 (1950); Squires
v. Lafferty, 95 W. Va. 307, 121 S.E. 90 (1924).
13, Williams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, 4 So. 350, 354 (1888).
3
'Appeal of Consol. Coal Co., 39 Wash. Co. 101, 106 (Pa. C.P. 1959).
"'Ingle v. Bottoms, 160 Ind. 73, 66 N.E. 160, 162 (1903).
13 Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Perry, 191 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
3' 135 U.S. 554 (1890).
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circumstances. The Texas Supreme Court in Brown v. Lundell""s
declared that in connection with the definitions of "negligence" and
"ordinary care," compliance with a custom or conformity with usual
and ordinary practices is not an absolute test of freedom from
negligence but that the jury may nevertheless properly consider the
usual and customary practices of other operators engaged in the same
or similar business. Thus, one of the standards used to test the question of "negligence" is the common experience of men engaged in
the particular business; that is, there is no negligence where the
evidence shows conduct consistent with that of prudent and careful
men in the business.1 " However, it is not "negligence" with which
the court is concerned when determining, or, in the proper case, when
inquiring of the jury whether the operator has used that which is
"reasonably necessary." It would, therefore, seem advisable and proper
(a) to limit the standard used to test "negligence" to its application
to the negligence issues, and (b) to apply to the question of the use
of the premises for operations, the definition of "reasonably necessary" as that which is practical or reasonably convenient in the
common experience of prudent men engaged in the business of
exploring, drilling for, and producing oil and gas.
In applying these rules and standards, the courts have placed the
burden of proof upon the complaining surface owner to establish
either (1) the use of more land than was reasonably necessary or
(2) negligence or wanton conduct. ' s As a court stated in Arnold

H. Bruner & Co. v. McCauley:'
Appellee [lessor] in the trial of the case recognized the well settled
rule of law that the lessee in an oil and gas lease has the right to
use as much of the surface as is reasonably necessary to carry out the
purpose of its lease....
The appellee [lessor] had the burden of proving not only that appellant [lessee] used more land than was reasonably necessary in its drilling
136
137

162 Tex. 85, 344 S.W.2d 863 (1961).
See Lynn v. Maag, 220 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1955); Wohlford v. American Gas Prod.

Co., 218 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1955); Phoenix v. Graham, 349 Ill. App. 326, 110 N.E.2d
669 (1953); McClaren v. G. S. Robins & Co., 349 Mo. 653, 162 S.W.2d 856 (1942);
Blake v. Fried, 173 Pa. Super. 27, 95 A.2d 360 (1953); Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R. v.
Alexander, 103 Tex. 594, 132 S.W. 119 (1910); Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Vaught, 294 S.W.
865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error dism.
"ss See Vodopija v. Gulf Ref. Co., 198 F2d 344 (5th Cir. 1952); Phoenix v. Graham,
supra note 137; Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dacus, 325 P.2d 1035 (Okla. 1958); Pure Oil Co.
v. Gear, 183 Okla. 489, 83 P.2d 389 (1938); Pure Oil Co. v. Chisholm, 181 Okla. 618,
75 P.2d 464 (1936); Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 271 S.W.2d 410
(1954); Arnold H. Bruner & Co. v. McCauley, 319 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958);
Blocker v. Wichita River Oil Co., 295 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Robinson Drilling
Co. v. Moses, 256 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); West Cent. Drilling Co. v. Malone,
219 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
"3s Note 138 supra.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

operations, but also the burden of proving his damages with sufficient
certainty to enable a jury to compute them. 4 '
Similarly, it was held by the Texas Supreme Court in Warren
Petroleum Corp. v. Martin,". "It was necessary for respondent
[lessor] to plead and prove that petitioner [lessee] used more land
than was necessary."
IX.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, most of the decisions appear to establish the legal
right of the mineral owner to use so much of the surface estate for
that period of time during which he is producing the oil or gas
at a profit to himself. Yet we find these statements:
May an operator continue to use as much space as he wants so long
as he can produce oil in paying quantities from a well that is producing an exorbitant amount of salt water? Certainly, the lessor should
not be regarded as authorizing by his lease the use of methods that the
ordinary prudent operator would not use. Moreover, it is suggested
that the lessor should not be regarded as authorizing the doing of more
damage than is reasonable in the light of the value of the oil being
produced. Thus, it may be necessary to do more damage than is reasonable even though the defendant is operating in the best known manner,
since the surface soil is a valuable natural resource as well as the oil.
The point is that the operator should be required to discontinue operations if salt water is being produced in such large quantities that, by
reason of the damage necessarily resulting, it becomes no longer socially
desirable to capture the oil. Finally, even though the oil extracted may
be more valuable than the property being damaged, it is suggested
that the lessor should not be regarded as authorizing production that is
causing or is likely to cause more damage to him than the royalties he
is to receive.'
By written contract and grant a lessee acquires the right to go
upon the land to discover and take minerals. He pays what the

parties then agree to be a valuable consideration. The lessor accepts
that consideration when he needs and wants it. Some wells produce

more salt water than the surface owner or even "the public" would
consider "socially desirable." Some wells occupy more of the land
than the lessor or his vendee or surface tenant ever contemplated.
Some operations occupy the entire premises to the exclusion of the
lessor. Some surface property becomes much more valuable than
the production by reason of its proximity to or inclusion within one
140

Id. at 764.

"'

153 Tex. 465, 469, 271 S.W.2d 410, 413 (1954).
& Jones, supra note 102, at 13.

142Keeton
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of the progressive and ever-growing cities. In many cases, insofar
as a surface owner and all those in sympathy with him are concerned,
it becomes "no longer socially desirable to capture the oil." In such
cases it is probable that the surface owner, buttressed by the energetic
subdivider, could establish to the satisfaction of a jury not interested
in the oil business that it was no longer socially desirable to capture
the oil and sell it on the open market. However, the parties made
their contract voluntarily, in good faith, with the mutual expectation of its enforcement according to its terms.
It has been wisely said, "As men bound themselves so shall they
be bound." '43 "The citizen has the liberty of contract as a natural
right which is beyond the power of the government to take from
him.".1 "Courts are not authorized to make contracts for the parties,
but must construe them as written, and where plain, common words
are used in their ordinary meaning, they must be accepted in that
sense.". 4. Finally, as the Texas Supreme Court solemnly stated in

Wood Motor Co. v. Nebel: "
Long ago Sir George Jessel wrote:

"...

if there is one thing which

more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting,
and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall
be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice. Therefore,
you have this paramount public policy to consider-that you are not
lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract." Printing and
Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 19 L.R., Equity, 462, 465.47

This argument appears to have been expressed recently by a
California court in Sicinon v. Russell, 48 where the plaintiffs pur-

chased property located within the city of Los Angeles and wanted
to subdivide it into thirty residential lots. By reason of the development of the area, the land had become much more valuable for
residential uses and would have produced a greatly enhanced return
to the owners if the operator could have been required to discontinue
operations. The court undoubtedly considered the lease contract,
the position of the parties, and that which was "socially desirable,"
and it is believed that it properly held:
143Union

Oil Co. v. Ogden, 278 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref.

n.r.e.

144 St. Louis, S.W. Ry. v. Griffin, 106 Tex. 477, 483, 171 S.W. 703, 704 (1914).
141 Shell Oil Co. v. Manley Oil Corp., 124 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316

U.S. 690 (1942).
14 150 Tex. 86, 238 S.W.2d 181 (1951).
141 Id. at 93, 238 S.W.2d at 185.
141 15 Cal. Rep. 218 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
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It is argued . . . that there is a factual question relating to "frustration of purpose due to failure of consideration." The lease expressly
provides that the lessee is "to have and to hold the same for a term of
twenty (20) years from and after the date hereof and so long thereafter as oil or gas

. . .

is produced therefrom." It is not contended that

oil or gas is no longer being produced, and obviously the twenty-year
period has not expired. Its terms do not set forth a minimum production which, if not met, will terminate the lease. The situation is
merely one in which plaintiffs' predecessors surrendered their rights
to use the surface for a consideration with which plaintiffs are not
satisfied. In order to regain the rights, plaintiffs must negotiate with
the person to whom they were surrendered on terms agreeable to
both. 4 '

149Id. at 220-21.

